

Economics of Sustainable Networks: Public Engagement and Investment

Tooraj Jamasb

Department of Economics and Finance

Durham University Business School

tooraj.jamasb@durham.ac.uk

About us

- Durham University
- Durham Energy Institute
- Energy Doctoral Training Centre
- Durham University Business School
 - Wenche Tobiasson
 - Rabindra Nepal
 - Rahmat Poudineh



Public Engagement in Network Development

A New Institutional Economics View Beaully-Denny Project, Scotland

Wenche Tobiasson
Christina Beestermöller
Helena Meier
Tooraj Jamasb



Economic features of grid development

- Large sunk costs
- Numerous different stakeholders
- Public goods
- Externalities
- Incomplete contracts
- Information asymmetries

Beauly-Denny project: Facts


- High Voltage Transmission line between Beauly, near Inverness, and Denny, near Stirling
- Ten year planning process between 2002-2012
- **220km long**, 600 steel pylons between 43 and 65m tall.
- Total Investment: Over £750m
- Key infrastructural development to connect renewable energy generation in the North to the network
- Over 20,000 objections from mainly Scotland but also other parts of the world
- **Longest ever public inquiry in Scotland**

Theoretical approach: New Institutional Economics

- Neoclassical Economics assumes costless transactions, rational actors and perfect information → Unrealistic
- New Institutional Economics central concepts
 - Transaction cost
 - Property-rights
 - Principal-Agent relationships
 - Market failure
- The concepts are connected through the costs of transacting
 - Uncertainty, opportunism, incomplete contracts, ill-defined property rights and miscommunicated principal-agent relationships increase these costs

Conceptual governance model

- Market based or non-market based
 - Coase (1937), Williamson (1979)
- The optimal (cost minimizing) governance structure determined from the characteristics of a specific activity



Public engagement

Current

- Characterised by one-way communication
- Limited
- Unstructured
- Ineffective downstream in decision-making process
- Non-integrated market based

Suggested future

- Two-way discussion
- At a place upstream in decision-making process
- Integrated non-market based
- Clear, uniform framework to limit opportunism, uncertainty, information asymmetry, and thus transaction costs
- Increased transparency

Using Supervised Environmental Composites in Production and Efficiency Analyses: An Application to Norwegian Electricity Networks

Christian Growitsch

***Institute of Energy Economics,
University of Cologne***

Tooraj Jamasb

***Department of Economics and Finance,
Durham University Business School***

Luis Orea

***Efficiency Group, Department of Economics,
University of Oviedo***

**EWI Working Paper
No 12/18, December 2012
Institute of Energy Economics
University of Cologne**


Introduction

- New technologies allow researchers to collect and analyze large amounts of data at relatively low cost.
 - Computational biology, climatology, geology, neurology, health science, economics, and finance.
- Reducing the dimensions of data is a natural and sometimes necessary manner in order to proceed with massive data analyses.
- The action of replacing a set of regressors with a lower-dimensional function is called dimension reduction.
- The reduction is labeled as sufficient or supervised when this reduction is achieved without loss of information (Fisher ,1922).
- Li (1991) introduced the first method for sufficient dimension reduction, i.e. sliced inverse regression (SIR).
 - **not used in production economics and efficiency analysis.**


- We apply these techniques to a dataset of Norwegian electricity distribution networks, which are regulated using **incentive regulation** schemes based on efficiency analyses.
- **Weather and geographic conditions** are the most commonly factors perceived to be affecting the performance of electricity networks.
- To reduce the dimensions of the environmental variables we use two **supervised** methods:
 - SIR = sliced inverse regression
 - PIR = parametric inverse regression.
- We use the most commonly **unsupervised** method (e.g. PCA) as a benchmark.
- We also examine whether **efficiency analyses** are robust with respect to using one or other type of methods.

Partial goodness-of-fit

Partial R²



Partial BIC



Investment and Efficiency under Incentive Regulation: Analysis of Norwegian DNOs

Rahmat Poudineh
Tooraj Jamasb


- We use a dataset comprising a balanced panel of 129 distribution companies from 2004 to 2010
- The inputs are capital expenditure (In) and other costs (C_1)

$$C_1 = Opex + Cost\ of\ Losses + Cost\ of\ Energy\ Not\ Supplied$$

- The “total number of customers”, “number of substations” and “length of network” are used as outputs
- The parameters used in the model are obtained by maximum likelihood estimation procedure
- All variables are divided by their sample median prior to estimation


Results - Efficiency variation

- Investment has impacted efficiency and in a relatively wide range
- On average, investments led to 4.8% efficiency gain



Results - Efficiency gain and loss

- Efficiency loss is prevalent among the companies with lower investment to total cost ratios
- Middle size share of investment created more efficiency gain
- Again high share of investments created less efficiency gain



Dynamic Efficiency and Incentive Regulation: Analysis of Norwegian DNOs

Rahmat Poudineh
Tooraj Jamasb

Dynamic efficiency

- The measure of efficiency obtained in benchmarking is only appropriate for the short run
- Because, it captures the firm's performance in a snapshot towards its long run equilibrium
- The factors affecting short run behaviour of firm may not adjust instantaneously when the firm invests (e.g., in new technologies or R&D)
- Under this condition, investment may create a virtual inefficiency which persists over time

Results

Variable	Simple random effect		Correlated random effect	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
β_0	0.34205	(0.053887)	0.23665	(0.051422)
β_1	0.28762	(0.046698)	0.11701	(0.104343)
β_2	0.36065	(0.029827)	0.21606	(0.093205)
β_3	0.24970	(0.036858)	0.11259	(0.056200)
β_4	0.09727	(0.038841)	0.03807	(0.070256)
β_5	-0.06312	(0.100805)	-0.28806	(0.182883)
β_6	-0.06084	(0.053950)	-0.21201	(0.071650)
β_7	-0.02394	(0.072697)	0.01034	(0.125549)
β_8	-0.00349	(0.030478)	-0.01356	(0.046992)
β_9	0.04121	(0.052897)	0.20701	(0.090193)
ξ_1	0.00007	(0.000210)	0.03050	(0.003544)
ξ_2	0.00000	(0.000000)	-0.00002	(0.000006)
σ_v	0.03418	(0.003877)	0.03899	(0.003730)
δ	0.26944	(0.057608)	0.46890	(0.106928)
ρ	0.76600	(0.038328)	0.69766	(0.064994)
σ_u	0.24952	(0.027429)	0.28747	(0.036909)
σ_ω	0.12275	(0.010901)	0.11816	(0.009491)
<i>Long run TE</i>	0.75832		0.82424	
<i>Log likelihood</i>	1071.00		1163.80	
<i>Posterior probability</i>	0.00000		0.00000	

Conclusions

- 76% of ratio of inefficiency is transmitted to the subsequent periods
- This arises because of technological difference among firms or cyclical investments
- This effect of sluggish adjustment of output is problematic for companies revenue under ex-post regulatory treatment of investment
- Thus, inclusion of capital cost in benchmarking model might result in unintended outcome for investment and innovation behaviour of distribution companies

Determinates of Investments:

Analysis of Norwegian DNOs


Rahmat Poudineh
Tooraj Jamasb

Methodology

- Due to the uncertainty around the response of the firm to different incentive instruments we adopt a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) technique
- BMA is a powerful tool to examine the extent to which any given factor improves the explanatory power of the estimated models when it is included
- It takes into account the uncertainties around model selection and estimation

Group	Variable	Name	Min	Max	Mean
Dependent	Investment*	<i>IN</i>	74	337124	22003
Group 1: Demand factors	Energy density (MWh/KM)	<i>DENS</i>	137	2234	546
	Number of stations (#)	<i>NS</i>	29	14405	993
	Number of customers(#)	<i>NC</i>	243	535443	19869
	Number of leisure home (#)	<i>RE</i>	68	27307	2279
	Distributed generation (MW)	<i>DG</i>	0	96	10
Group 2: Quality factors	Cost of energy not supplied*	<i>CENS</i>	12	58527	2928
	Cost of network energy loss*	<i>CNEL</i>	278	394127	14949
Group 3: Environmental factors	Share of overhead lines (%)	<i>OH</i>	0.13	0.97	0.67
	Snow condition (millimetres)	<i>snow</i>	53	1194	367
	Wind and distance to coast (ratio)	<i>wind</i>	0	0.16	0.015
	Forest productivity (fraction)	<i>forest</i>	0	0.55	0.16
Group 4: Other factors	Depreciation*	<i>DEP</i>	631	281978	16606
	Operational expenditure*	<i>OPEX</i>	878	854646	45136

Posterior inclusion probability



Conclusions

- Depreciations, number of leisure homes, number of transformers, energy density, and cost of energy not supplied are main drivers of investments
- No evidence of environmental factors driving investments
- No investment effect from distributed generation sources
- Cost of network energy loss also had no impact on investments
- Possibly, because of different treatment of cost of network energy loss and quality of service

